We consider a continuous-time, rate-based model of network revenue management. Under mild assumptions, we construct a simple -optimal bid-price control, which can be viewed as a perturbation of a bid-price control in the classical sense [Williamson, E. L. 1992 . Airline network seat control. Ph.D. thesis, MIT, Cambridge, MA]. We show that the associated bid-price process forms a martingale and the corresponding booking controls converge in an appropriate sense to an optimal control as tends to 0. Moreover, we show that there exists an optimal generalized bid-price control, where the bid-price process forms a martingale and is used in conjunction with a capacity usage limit process. We also discuss its connection to the bid-price controls in the classical sense and sufficient conditions for the (near) optimality of the latter.
1. Introduction. Network revenue management problems arise naturally in airline, railway, cruise-line, and hotel revenue management, more generally, whenever, customers buy bundles of resources under various terms and conditions. In such settings, bid-price controls represent an intuitively appealing and powerful approach to quantity-based revenue management. Given a network of resources, a bid-price control assigns a threshold price, that is, a bid price, for each resource dynamically over time. Then, the decision to fulfill a booking request is made based on the availability of various resources and whether the revenue associated with the request exceeds the sum of the bid-prices of the resources it uses. Bid-price controls simplify decision making in network revenue management by reducing the number of parameters required for implementation (one bid price is specified for each resource) because evaluating a booking request requires only a simple comparison of the fare to the sum of the bid prices for the requested resources.
Bid-price controls were introduced by Simpson [27] and further analyzed by Williamson [32] . Williamson computes the bid prices of various resources by means of mathematical programming formulations and interprets the bid-price of a resource as the opportunity cost of using one additional unit of the resource. This reflects the intuitive notion that a booking request should be accepted only if its fare exceeds the opportunity cost of the reduction in resource capacities required to satisfy that request. Thus, bid prices retrieved from a revenue management system may facilitate decision making in other areas of management such as capacity planning or pricing.
Talluri and van Ryzin [28] considers bid price controls in a discrete time model of network revenue management, where the discretization is fine enough such that in each period at most one request arrives. In this context, a bid-price control is implemented by specifying one bid price for each resource (leg) for each time period and capacity vector, and the request is accepted if the fare of the request is higher than the sum of the bid prices it uses. The authors show that the optimal policy need not correspond to a bid-price control, and provide a two-period counter example which shows that the bid-price policy as defined immediately above may not result in optimal accept/deny decisions. The insight they provide for why bid-price controls may not be optimal is that the bid price for a resource may not correspond to the opportunity cost of using one additional unit of that resource for two reasons: First, selling one unit of capacity might be a large change in the capacity of several resources at the same time if the remaining capacity is low and hence the interpretation of the bid prices as the marginal value of one unit of additional capacity may not be correct. Second, the revenues may depend on the remaining capacity in a nonlinear way.
Despite this counter example, bid-price controls are widely used in practice (cf. Phillips [20] ), as they provide a simple, yet powerful approach to quantity-based network revenue management. In this vein, researchers have worked on various practical heuristic methods to derive bid-price controls. Bertsimas and Popescu [7] proposed a new method based on approximate dynamic programming. Their method computes adaptive and nonadditive bid prices based on a linear programming approximation to the value function of a dynamic programming formulation. The authors provide a comparison of their method and the bid-price control based on deterministic linear programming approach and show that their algorithm results in higher revenues and more robust performance.
Topaloglu [30] revisits the network revenue management problem studied in Talluri and van Ryzin [28] and proposes a new method to compute bid prices. Topaloglu explicitly considers the temporal dynamics of the customer arrivals and generates bid prices that depend on the remaining leg capacities. His method is based on relaxing certain capacity constraints that link decisions for different flight legs by associating Lagrange multipliers with them. Then the problem is decomposed by flight legs and one can concentrate on one flight leg at a time, which simplifies the problem tremendously. Topaloglu also shows through a numerical study that his method outperforms the standard heuristics significantly.
Topaloglu and Kunnumkal [31] follows a similar approach but uses a different relaxation of the capacity constraints which yields time-dependent prices. Their approach provides an upper bound on the optimal objective value of the problem, which is tighter than the one obtained from the so-called deterministic linear program. The authors also show that the bid prices they propose are asymptotically optimal as leg capacities and demand grow proportionally to infinity. Moreover, they discuss how to adapt their method to incorporate cancellations. Finally, the authors demonstrate through numerical examples that their method can improve on the existing methods. Another related paper is Adelman [1] . Adelman considers the dynamic programming formulation of the network revenue management problem. Then assuming an affine functional form for the value function and using the linear programming representation of the dynamic programming formulation, the author computes time-dependent (deterministic) bid prices. He also shows that his approach yields an upper bound tighter than the one obtained from the deterministic linear program. Both Adelman [1] and Topaloglu and Kunnumkal [31] observe that their (approximate) method yields (deterministic) bid prices which are decreasing over time.
Another paper related to ours is Kleywegt [18] , where the author considers a stylized (deterministic) fluid model of a general dynamic pricing problem for selling a network of resources. In Kleywegt's model prices are chosen dynamically to sell products (or itineraries) to multiple customer classes over time. Kleywegt's model is very general in terms of problem primitives and allows order cancellations. Moreover, Kleywegt observes that his model readily extends to incorporate probabilistic customer choice behavior. The author also develops a solution method and tests it with some numerical examples. Among other things, Kleywegt shows through an exact analysis that in his setting the opportunity cost of capacity under an optimal policy remains constant, which is in line with the martingale property of optimal bid prices in our setting. Indeed, looking more carefully at the numerical examples of Adelman [1] and Topaloglu and Kunnumkal [31] reveals that the bid prices seem to be constant except toward the end of planning horizon, which may be because of their approximate mode of analysis.
Topaloglu [29] presents a stochastic approximation method to compute bid prices in network revenue management problems by viewing the total expected revenue as a function of bid prices and using sample path derivatives to identify a good set of bid prices. The author demonstrates through numerical examples that the bid prices obtained by his method outperform the ones by the standard methods especially when bid prices are not computed frequently. Farias [16] applies approximate dynamic programming ideas to revenue management problems. Reiman and Wang [21] develops a novel diffusion approximation to the network revenue management and advances a policy which is asymptotically optimal under the so-called diffusion scaling.
An important antecedent of this paper Akan and Ata [3] studies a discrete-time network revenue management model, where a system manager observes the evolution of information continuously, and exerts control at the end of each period. The authors identify a class of adapted bid-price controls, where a bid-price control involves a bid-price process and a capacity usage limit process. Akan and Ata [3] shows that there does exist an optimal policy within that class. Moreover, optimal (adapted) bid prices form a martingale. These results are proved without making any assumptions on the stochastic structure of demand, allowing nonstationary demand with an arbitrary dependence structure, including both intertemporal and cross-product dependencies. Akan and Ata [3] also proposes a predictable bid-price control where bid prices used in the current period are last updated in the previous period. The authors develop an upper bound on the optimality gap for this predictable bidprice control in terms of the (quadratic) variations of the demand and bid-price processes, and the updating frequency of bid prices, which quantifies the relationship between the updating frequency of the bid prices and their performance, hence, provides insights on how to optimally choose the updating frequency of bid prices. Moreover, the authors consider an asymptotic regime where periods get small, while the planning horizon and the underlying probabilistic primitives remain unchanged. The novel feature of this asymptotic regime is that it preserves the stochastic nature of demand unlike most asymptotic regimes considered previously in the revenue management literature. Then using the upper bound they advanced, the authors show that the optimality gap vanishes in two important special cases where the incremental information or the incremental demand is small over short time intervals.
In this paper, we analyze a continuous-time, rate-based model of network revenue management. Our main contribution is to prove -optimality of a simple bid-price control. The proposed bid-price control only uses bid-prices associated with various resources, hence, it is easy to implement. In what follows, we also construct an optimal generalized bid-price control which consists of a bid-price process and a capacity usage limit process, where the bid-price process forms a martingale. Although the generalized bid-price control we introduce here resembles the bid-price control of Akan and Ata [3] , it yields new insights in this setting.
The martingale property of (optimal) bid prices was first established in Akan and Ata [3] for a discrete-time model. We provide further insights and implications of the martingale property of the (near) optimal bid prices, which become more transparent in our continuous-time model. Although the martingale property is primarily a theoretical contribution, it has surprising implications, which are explored in Akan [2] . For instance, exploiting the martingale property one can connect the optimal bid prices to Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (FBSDE). Our paper paves the way for this novel connection by studying the network revenue management problem through a continuous-time stochastic fluid model. Given the readily available numerical methods for computing solutions FBSDEs, one may borrow that machinery to compute bid prices. Thus, this connection sets the stage up for a novel and analytically sound computational approach and is explored in Akan [2] .
From a methodological perspective, our analysis builds on the convex analysis framework of Rockafellar and Wets [26] and the duality results of Bismut [8] and illustrates the utility of stochastic duality techniques and their applicability in the revenue management context. Bismut [8] develops a new approach to problems of stochastic optimal control using convex duality. In particular, Bismut [8] defines the dual problems in stochastic optimal control and the coextremality conditions associated with the dual optima by applying general methods of convex analysis introduced by Rockafellar [22] - [25] . Bismut also provides results on the existence of optimal solutions for a general class of convex stochastic control problems, which include the stochastic control problems studied in this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Precise definition of several bid-price controls are introduced in §3. A dual formulation to the network revenue management problem and the associated coextremality conditions are provided in §4. An optimal generalized bid-price mechanism is defined in §5. In §6, we discuss a perturbed network revenue management and its dual, based on which we also define an -optimal bid-price control. In §7, some concluding remarks are provided along with future research directions. The proofs, derivations and auxiliary results are relegated to Appendices A through D throughout the paper.
The model.
We analyze a continuous-time, rate-based model of network revenue management. There are K resources and J products. In an airline setting a resource is a flight leg and a product is a specific itinerary. A primitive of our model is a K × J nonnegative capacity consumption matrix A, where A kj denotes the amount of resource k capacity consumed by one unit of product j. The jth column of A is denoted by A j . The definition of a product contains all terms and conditions associated with the purchase. Thus, there may be more than one product that use the same amount of each resource but differ in price, purchase restrictions etc. Therefore, in practice, the number of products will be large compared to the number of resources. In our model, at each point in time the system manager observes the demand rate and chooses the corresponding booking rate for each product. The booking rates for the products translate into consumption rates for the resources through the capacity consumption matrix A. The objective is to maximize expected revenues over the time horizon 0 T subject to capacity and demand constraints.
Uncertainty is modeled by a given complete probability space ( , , ), and the evolution of information is modeled through the increasing collection t t ∈ + of complete sub--fields of . In particular, t represents the information available to the system manager at time t. All stochastic processes to appear will be adapted to the filtration t t ∈ + . We assume that t t ∈ + is right-continuous and has no time discontinuity as in Bismut [8] . An information structure that has no time discontinuity is also referred to as a quasi-continuous information structure in Huang [17] , which also proves that the natural filtrations of most of the commonly encountered processes are quasi-continuous, including the natural filtrations generated by the Poisson process and Brownian motion. As a matter of fact, Bismut [9] extends the framework and results in Bismut [8] to the more general setting of the control of semi-martingales where the quasi-continuity assumption is also dropped.
The demand for the various products is generated by the J -dimensional demand rate process d t t ∈ × 0 T }. In particular, d j t is the rate at which demand for product j arrives at the system at time t along the sample path . Then, the cumulative demand observed by the system manager for product j over the interval t 1 t 2 is
if sample path ∈ is realized. The following are the only two assumptions we make on the demand rate process: We assume that the demand rate process d t t ∈ × 0 T is bounded and adapted to the filtration t 0 ≤ t ≤ T . In particular, we allow for nonstationary demand with an arbitrary dependence structure, including both intertemporal and cross-product dependencies.
As the system evolves, the system manager exerts control on the system by selecting a nonnegative vector of booking rates at each point in time. That is, for each ∈ and 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the system manager chooses the J -dimensional vector of booking rates, denoted by u t . In particular, u j t denotes the booking rate for product j at time t along the sample path for j = 1 J . Then, under the control u t t ∈ × 0 T , the cumulative bookings for product j up to time t along sample path is given by
The system state at time t ∈ 0 T for the realization is the K-dimensional vector of remaining capacities denoted by x t . The component x k t denotes the remaining capacity for resource k = 1 K at time t. Given a control u t t ∈ × 0 T , the system state evolves according to the following system dynamics equation:
where C is the initial capacity vector and U t is the vector of cumulative bookings up to time t, whose jth component is given by (1) . We use the shorthand notation x to denote the stochastic process x t t ∈ × 0 T . Similarly, u denotes the booking rate process u t t ∈ × 0 T . A booking rate process u is feasible only if it satisfies demand and capacity restrictions. The demand restriction on bookings is that for each t ∈ × 0 T , the booking rate for each product should be less than or equal to the demand rate for that product. The capacity restriction on bookings is that the remaining capacity for each resource at the terminal time T should be nonnegative almost surely.
A booking rate vector u t at time t given a sample path results in an instantaneous revenue rate of f t · u t , where f t is the exogenously set vector of fares. The process of fares f t t ∈ × 0 T is bounded, nonnegative and adapted to the information structure t t ∈ + . The fare process can be nonstationary and arbitrarily correlated with the demand process, which, in turn, allows us to model dependencies between the fare and demand process and potentially capture demand substitution across products and over time.
The objective is to choose a booking rate process u so as to maximize expected revenue subject to the demand and capacity restrictions. That is, choose booking rate vector u t for each t ∈ × 0 T so as to
where the first and second constraints describe how capacity evolves over time, and the third and fourth constraints are the demand and capacity restrictions, respectively. Throughout the rest of the paper we will refer to the formulation (P) as the network revenue management problem.
As an aside, because the fare process can be an arbitrary adapted stochastic process, the formulation (P) of the network revenue management problem subsumes possible discounted formulations.
3. Bid-price control definitions and summary of results. In our setting, a bid-price process is a K-dimensional, nonnegative stochastic process = t t ∈ × 0 T , where k t denotes the bid-price, or the shadow price, associated with resource k at time t along the sample path . Next, we introduce three closely related definitions of bid-price controls, which will be used in subsequent sections.
Definition 3.1 (Bid-Price Control). Given a bid-price process = t t ∈ × 0 T and a booking function 3 + → + , the pair is called a bid-price control, where the corresponding booking rates for each product j = 1 J are determined as follows:
Given a bid-price control , for each product j and each t , the booking function compares the fare f j t with the sum of the bid prices for the resources used by product j, t A j , and dictates how much of the demand rate d j t to book. Our definition allows for nonlinear booking functions. In particular, it may not result in a "bang-bang" booking process; u is called a bang-bang booking process if u j t ∈ 0 d j t for almost all t ∈ × 0 T and j = 1 J . In this sense, our definition of a bid-price control is more generous than the classical definition; and the latter can be viewed as a special case of ours. In particular, the booking decisions under a bid-price control in the classical sense necessarily result in a bang-bang booking process. The next definition introduces the bid-price control in the classical sense in our setting.
Definition 3.2 (Classical Bid-Price Control). For each bid-price process , define the corresponding classical bid-price control, denoted also by , such that it dictates the following booking rates for each product j = 1 J and t ∈ × 0 T :
One can view a classical bid-price control as a specific bid-price control where z = z 3 1 z 2 ≥z 1 for z ∈ 3 + from which it follows that
A bid-price control is called optimal if the booking rates resulting from (cf. (3)), constitute an optimal solution to the network revenue management problem (P). Given > 0, a bid-price control ( ) is called -optimal if the revenue associated with the resulting booking process u is within of the optimal objective value of the network revenue management problem (P).
An important virtue of bid-price controls is that they offer a tractable solution for a complex problem of allocating a network of resources to a large number of products. Bid-price controls simplify the control in network revenue management by reducing the number of parameters required for implementation (one bid price is specified for each resource). In addition, a bid-price control decomposes the problem across time, sample paths, and products. That is, given a bid-price control ( ), at each point in time and for every sample path, the booking rates are determined only as a function of the current bid-prices, fares, and demand rates without having to account for the future impact of current decisions. Moreover, the booking decisions for each product can be made in isolation, independently of the booking decisions for other products.
Next, we consider a simple example to illustrate the classical bid-price controls. This example is indeed the continous-time, rate-based version of the counterexample provided by Talluri and van Ryzin [28] . Surprisingly, a classical bid-price control is optimal in our continuous time setup, leading to new insights. Example 1. There are two resources and three products with the associated capacity consumption matrix
The planning horizon is 0 2 . Each resource has initial capacity of one, that is, C = 1 1 . There is no uncertainty or nonstationarity in product fares. In particular, the vector of product fares is given by f = 250 250 500
The only uncertainty is in the demand rate process. The evolution of uncertainty is suitably represented by an information tree in Figure 1 . The terminal nodes of the tree correspond to specific sample paths. The intermediate set of nodes represent the resolved uncertainty by time t = 1 On each arc of the information tree displayed is the corresponding demand rate vector. There are six sample paths and the probability of each sample path is also displayed in Figure 1 , from which one can deduce the probabilities of various events. In particular, during 0 1 we will see demand for only one type of product (at rate 1). The probability of having demand for product 3 is 0 4; for product 1 it is 0 3 and for product 2 it is 0 3. On the other hand, during 1 2 we see demand for product 3 (at rate 1) with probability 0 8 or no demand with probability 0 2 To be more specific, the demand rate process displayed in Figure 1 is given as follows:
It is easy to see that the optimal solution is to book only product 3, while denying all other requests. This results in the expected revenue of 440. Formally, the solution is given as follows:
As an aside, this solution corresponds to the optimal solution of the Talluri Observe that the classical bid-price control results in the optimal bookings given in (5)- (7), and hence yields expected revenue of 440. It is also easy to check that the bid-price process forms a martingale. Also note that the choice of the optimal bid-price control is not unique. One can easily come up with other optimal classical bid prices. The bid-price control given immediately above shows that a classical bid-price control is indeed optimal for this particular example. Thus, it sheds light onto reasons for nonoptimality in the Talluri-van Ryzin example. As pointed out earlier in the literature, the nonoptimality of classical bid-price controls stems from discreteness, and, in particular, from the fact that each booking consumes a large fraction of remaining capacity. In contrast, in our setting the bookings at each point in time consumes only an infinitesimal amount of capacity. We also allow frequent (indeed continuous) updating of bid prices. These allow the bid-price controls to perform optimally. Therefore, in addition to discreteness of the problem, infrequent updating of bid prices may be another reason for nonoptimality of classical bid-price controls.
Although the classical bid-price controls are optimal for the example immediately above, we next present an example where no classical bid price control can be optimal. Indeed, we show a stronger result that no bang-bang control can be optimal.
Example 2. We have a single resource and two products. As in the earlier example the fares are constant. In particular, we have
The planning horizon is 0 1 . The underlying probability space is defined as follows: = 0 1 and is the collection of Borel subsets of 0 1 (suitably completed). Let be a random variable defined on with strictly positive density g on 0 1 . Then is the probability measure induced by g; and each sample path can be thought of as a particular realization of . Demand for the two products is given as follows:
The information t available at time t is the -algebra generated by d s 0 ≤ s ≤ t , suitably completed with the null sets of . In this setting, we prove that no classical bid-price control adapted to t t ≥ 0 can be optimal. First, observe that the revenue management problem (P) has a pathwise solution in this example, which is given as follows: We argue by contradiction to conclude that no classical bid-price control can be optimal. Suppose that there exists an optimal bid-price control . First, note that under we must have
That is, we must book exactly half of the requests for product 1. Suppose (8) does not hold. Then, with positive probability we have at least one of the following:
If we have (9) with positive probability, then for those sample paths the total revenue is given by
Thus, if (9) arises with positive probability, then the expected revenues under will be strictly less than 200 − 100 Ɛ , the optimal objective. Similarly, if (10) happens with positive probability, then the revenue along such a sample path is
Thus, the expected revenue is strictly less than 200−100 Ɛ in this case too, contradicting optimality. Therefore, we must have (8) . That is, almost surely
Then since has a strictly positive density on 0 1 and both sides are absolutely continuous functions of , we conclude by differentiating both sides of (11) with respect to that for almost every t and sample path
which clearly is a contradiction. Thus, no classical bid-price control can be optimal. As this example shows no classical bid-price control can achieve optimal bookings in general. In this specific example, if we impose the upper bound of 1 on the capacity consumption rate and use the bid price of = 100 at all times, then the resulting bookings will be optimal. In §5, we show that this idea works in greater generality. That is, using bid prices in conjunction with limits on capacity consumption rates results in optimal bookings. To this end, the next definition introduces a generalized bid-price control along the lines of Akan and Ata [3] . In our setting, a generalized bid-price control involves a pair of stochastic processes , where is a bid-price process and = t t ∈ × 0 T is a K-dimensional, nonnegative stochastic process; we will refer to as the capacity usage limit process. Definition 3.3 (Generalized Bid-Price Control). Given a bid-price process and a capacity usage limit process , the pair is called a generalized bid-price control. For each t ∈ × 0 T , the booking rate vector u t corresponding to is given by the solution to the following linear program: Choose booking rate vector u so as to
In what follows, we first show that there exists an optimal generalized bid-price control for the network revenue management problem. We also show that the optimal bid-price process forms a martingale. Next, by the help of a perturbed version of the network revenue management problem, we construct an -optimal bid-price control ( ) for each > 0, where the associated bid-price process forms a martingale. The bid-price control ( ) can be viewed as a perturbation of the classical bid-price control corresponding to the bid-price process . In particular, it does not involve any capacity usage limits, and hence, is easier to implement. Finally, we show that for small values of , the booking process u corresponding to the bid-price control (
) is close to an optimal booking process for (P). These results are proved without making any assumptions on the stochastic structure of demand and fare processes, allowing nonstationary demand and fare processes with an arbitrary dependence structure, including both intertemporal and cross-product dependencies.
To facilitate our analysis of bid-price controls, in the next section we present a stochastic control problem that is dual to the network revenue management problem (P) in the sense of Bismut [8] .
4. Dual network revenue management problem. In this section we present the dual problem formulation (D) of the network revenue management problem (P) laid out in §2, and the coextremality results between the two formulations. The dual problem associated with the network revenue management problem (P) is obtained using the stochastic duality theory of Bismut [8] . Bismut [8] develops a new approach to problems of stochastic optimal control using convex duality, which enables us to express the network revenue management problem in an equivalent way but in a completely different context. In particular, Bismut [8] defines the dual problems in stochastic optimal control and the coextremality conditions associated with the dual optima by applying general methods of convex analysis introduced by Rockafellar [22] [23] [24] [25] .
Following Bismut [8] the dual problem of control associated with the network revenue management problem (P) can be stated as follows (see Appendix B for its derivation): Choose a K-dimensional, square integrable, random vector y 0 ∈ 0 and a K-dimensional, square-integrable martingale M, which is null at zero, stopped at time T and adapted to the filtration { t , t ∈ + }, so as to
where z + = max 0 z 1 max 0 z J for z ∈ J . In the dual problem formulation, y is the dual state variable. The value of the state variable y at time zero is given by y 0 ∈ 0 , which is constant if there is no randomness at time zero. The dual state vector y t can be interpreted as the shadow price for or the value assigned to the resources at time t along the sample path . Then the objective of the dual problem formulation can be interpreted as the value attributed to the network of resources by a given choice of the shadow price process. Thus, the dual problem formulation has the following interpretation: The system manager chooses the shadow price process y, which is a nonnegative martingale, so as to minimize the expected value she attributes to her network of resources.
In the dual problem formulation (D), M is a predictive term, null at zero, or the best estimate at time t of the unresolved uncertainty. M is a term that integrates the information on environmental factors. That is, it contains the relevant information from the future and serves the purpose of integrating into the dual variable y this necessary information.
A remarkable feature of the dual problem is that the dual state variable y can have jumps, corresponding to the jumps of M. To elaborate on this, consider the setting where the information is revealed continuously over time. In particular, consider a stopping time which is defined as the first time an event happens. Under a continuous information structure this event is foretellable by a sequence of events. Intuitively, no event takes us by surprise under a continuous information structure. As put by Dellacherie and Meyer [12, p. 128] , "We are forewarned by a succession of precursory signs, of the exact time the phenomenon will occur"; see Huang [17] for a precise definition of a continuous information structure.
An equivalent characterization of continuous information structures is that all martingales have continuous sample paths (cf. Huang [17] ). Moreover, the martingale term M of the dual problem formulation (D) will have jumps only if the information arrives discontinuously, say, because of unpredictable changes in the business environment, political situation etc. in which case the value of the resources reflected by the shadow prices has to be adjusted abruptly, in a discontinuous manner. That is, the new information can significantly increase or decrease the bid prices. Hence, continuity of M under a continuous information structure is the reflection of the continuous flow of information into the system.
To elaborate further, suppose that any martingale, and hence the optimal bid-prices can be represented as a stochastic integral with respect to a given Brownian motion w plus a martingale M that is orthogonal to w. Then, loosely speaking w contains the short term uncertainties and M is a prediction of the long-term uncertainties. The interpretation of the martingale term M is intuitively appealing because it enables us to express formally the distinction in the decision making process between continuous information processing which is done on a routine basis and discontinuous information processing done by reassessing the predictions.
The dual problem (D) and the primal problem (P) are closely linked to each other. Above all, the objective function values of (P) and (D) are equal. Moreover, any optimal primal solution and any optimal dual solution satisfy a set of coextremality conditions, which are necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. The following proposition summarizes the duality results between the two formulations that are relevant for our purposes; its proof is given in Appendix B. (12) and (13) given below:
and for j = 1 J and almost all
The following corollary is immediate from Proposition 4.1 and it provides an upper bound on the objective function value of the network revenue management problem (P). 
provides an upper bound on the objective function value of the network revenue management problem (P).
5. An optimal generalized bid-price control. In this section we show the existence of an optimal generalized bid-price control defined as in §3 such that the optimal bid-price process t t ∈ × 0 T forms a martingale. Recall that a generalized bid-price policy is said to be optimal if the booking rate process u t t ∈ × 0 T resulting from the execution of is optimal for the network revenue management problem (P) (cf. §3). The following theorem is the main result of this section and is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an optimal generalized bid-price control
such that the optimal bid-price process t t ∈ × 0 T is a martingale adapted to t t ∈ 0 T .
As can be seen from the proof of Theorem 5.1, we construct an optimal generalized bid-price control by using an optimal state trajectory y for the dual problem (D) as the bid-price process . To elaborate on its connection to the classical bid-price controls, fix t ∈ × 0 T and suppose that
Then it can be seen from the coextremality conditions (12) and (13) that the booking rate vector u t is uniquely determined by the bid-price vector t as follows: For j = 1 J ,
Our construction of the generalized bid-price control will choose the capacity usage limit process t = Au t in this case, and the optimal generalized bid-price control results in the same booking decisions as a classical bid-price control would (cf. (14)). Moreover, arguing heuristically, one can simply set = 0 and t = , in which case the execution of the generalized bid-price control reduces to a classical bid-price control, because the problem (P t ) decomposes across products. Differences may arise, though, when f j t = t A j for some products and the capacity usage limit vector t can be crucial in separating an optimal booking rate from a nonoptimal one. In this sense, the need for a capacity usage limit process for optimality is linked to the multiplicity of optimal solutions u to (P) associated with a given optimal dual solution y to (D). Recall that one reason cited for the nonoptimality of the classical bid-price controls is the discreteness of demand and bookings (cf. Talluri and van Ryzin [28] ). Our analysis suggests that discreteness may not be the only reason for nonoptimality as we avoid it by adapting a rate-based model, or a stochastic fluid model. Another reason for potential nonoptimality of the classical bidprice controls in our setting seems to be the multiplicity or degeneracy which arises when f j t = t A j for some product j = 1 J over a nonnegligible set of t . Further discussion of potential reasons for the nonoptimality of classical bid-price controls is deferred to §7.
In the next section, we pursue an alternative path and construct an -optimal bid-price control for any given > 0. To this end, we introduce a perturbed version of the network revenue management problem. The perturbed problem for > 0, in turn, gives rise to an -optimal bid price control, which can be viewed as a perturbation of a classical bid-price control. The perturbation results in a strictly concave problem which has a unique solution. This is a form of regularization that gives the strict complementarity needed to ensure that the optimal primal solution can be derived directly from the dual problem.
6. An -optimal bid-price control. In this section, we introduce a perturbed version of the network revenue management problem (P) and its dual. Then we derive the coextremality conditions between the two formulations, which eventually gives rise to an -optimal bid-price control. For each > 0, the perturbed problem (P ) can be stated as follows: Choose a booking rate vector u t for each t ∈ × 0 T so as to
where j t is defined as follows: For j = 1 J and t ∈ × 0 T , let
The perturbed problem (P is the same as the network revenue management problem (P), except for the quadratic term in its objective, which makes it a strictly concave problem. Thus, the perturbed problem (P has a unique solution. Consequently, by this simple perturbation we avoid the issues of multiplicity of the solution or degeneracy issues encountered earlier, which in turn leads to an easy characterization of the solution to the perturbed problem (P in terms of the optimal shadow price process derived from its dual formulation. The dual problem (D of the perturbed network revenue management problem (P can be stated as follows (see Appendix D for its derivation): Choose a K-dimensional, square integrable, random vector y 0 ∈ 0 and a K-dimensional, square-integrable martingale M, which is null at zero, stopped at time T and adapted to the filtration { t , t ∈ + }, so as to
As pointed out earlier, the difference between (P and (P) is that (P has the strictly concave term − t in its objective function in addition to the revenue term f t · u t , which makes (P a strictly concave problem. As a result, there is a unique optimal solution u for (P ) (cf. Proposition 6.2), which can be determined through the coextremality conditions between (P and (D (cf. Proposition 6.1).
The following proposition summarizes the duality results between the two formulations that are relevant for our purposes; its proof is given in Appendix D. (17) and (18) given below:
One would expect that for small values of the objective value of the perturbed problem (P is close to that of the network revenue management problem (P). Building on this intuition, we next construct a bid-price control which is -optimal for the network revenue management problem (P) for > 0. To facilitate our construction, fix an optimal state trajectory y for the perturbed dual problem (D ) for each > 0. Then, for > 0 let = y and
It follows from Definition 1 (cf. (3)), that for each > 0, the bookings under the bid-price control ( ) are given as follows.
for t ∈ × 0 T and j = 1 J . The following proposition states the optimality of the control u given in (20) for the perturbed problem (P ) and is proved in Appendix D.
Proposition 6.2. For each > 0, the booking control u t t ∈ × 0 T given in (20) is the unique optimal control for the perturbed problem (P ).
One would hope that for small values of > 0, the performance of the bid-price control is close to the optimal objective value of (P). Indeed, the following theorem establishes the -optimality of the bid-price control . It also shows that the booking controls u resulting from the bid-price controls > 0 are close to an optimal solution to the network revenue management problem (P) for small values of . Viewing the booking controls u for > 0 as an element of L 2 , the space of square integrable functions on × 0 T , it is easy to see that the controls u for > 0 are uniformly bounded in L 2 . Thus, it follows from Alaoglu's Theorem (cf. Dunford and Schwartz [14] ), that the collection of booking controls u > 0 is weak * compact. Defining as the collection of weak limit points of the sequences of booking controls u n n ≥ 1 where n 0 as n → , the following theorem establishes the optimality of every weak limit u ∈ , and its proof is given in Appendix D. 
(c) Every weak limit u ∈ of the booking controls u > 0 as 0 is an optimal booking control for the network revenue management problem (P).
For > 0 and product j = 1 J , the bid-price control behaves in the same way as a classical bid-price control as long as f j t − t A j does not fall in the interval 0 , in which case a classical bid-price control would dictate booking all of the demand. In contrast, the bid-price control results in a booking rate of t / , and as 0, the graph looks more and more like a step function, corresponding to a bang-bang control, which would result from a classical bid-price control.
7. Discussion and concluding remarks. We consider a continuous-time stochastic fluid model of network revenue management. First, we prove that there exists an optimal generalized bid-price control, where the bidprice process forms a martingale. A generalized bid-price control consists of a bid-price process and a capacity usage limit process, which creates limits on the instantaneous capacity usage rate of the resources. Next, we analyze a perturbed version of the network revenue management problem and its dual, using which we construct an -optimal bid-price control. The bid-price process associated with the -optimal bid-price control forms a martingale, too. Finally, we show that every weak * limit of the sequence of booking processes resulting from the -optimal bid-price controls as 0 is an optimal solution to the network revenue management problem.
Practical insights and implementation issues. Although we study a stylized rate-based model, or a stochastic fluid model, the insights we provide carry over to more practical settings. For instance, one can model the demand for various products as a multidimensional, doubly-stochastic Poisson process, where the intensity of the Poisson process is given by a constant multiple of the demand rate process d t t ∈ × 0 T of §2. For such systems with high initial capacity and high demand, the model introduced in §2 is a good approximation. Indeed, it is the so-called associated fluid model. It is important, however, to point out that our fluid model is a stochastic fluid model, and it captures all key trade-offs faced by the system manager unlike most fluid models considered in the literature which are deterministic models. Moreover, viewing our rate-based network revenue management model as a fluid model of a more practical system and using its solution, one can propose near optimal policies. To elaborate further, one can implement the -optimal bid-price controls proposed in the preceding sections in a practical setting as follows. At every point in time, given the -optimal bid prices for our rate based model, a request for product j is accepted if f j ≥ A j + , and it is rejected if f j ≤ A j , while the system manager flips a coin with success probability f j − A j / to decide when 0 < f j − A j < . That is, she accepts the request with probability f j − A j / and rejects it with probability 1 − f j − A j / when 0 < f j − A j < . Moreover, as updating the bid-prices continuously may not be practical, one could use a discrete review policy with sufficiently small review periods. We conjecture that such policies can be shown to be near optimal for systems with large capacity and high demand. Although we provide no proof of these assertions, the literature on large call centers and their analysis via fluid models make these claims plausible; see for example Bassamboo et al. [4, 5] .
Connection to dynamic programming. Recall that the stochastic primitives of our model are very general, allowing an arbitrary dependence structure both across time and across products. In particular, the underlying demand process need not be a Markovian process. Davis [11, p. 2] notes that " Bellman equation approach is essentially limited to Markovian systems." Therefore, analyzing the network revenue management problem (P) under general probabilistic assumptions by dynamic programming does not seem to be a viable approach. Thus, we adopt the convex analysis approach of Bismut [8] . Nonetheless, Bismut [8] formally derives a connection between his approach and the dynamic programming approach for controlled Ito processes, and shows formally (under various technical assumptions) that the optimal dual state variable equals the gradient of the value function obtained by dynamic programming along the optimal trajectory. Even if we look at the restrictive version of the network revenue management problem, which is Markovian, the state space constraints prevent us from making such a connection. Nonetheless, we intuitively expect in a Markovian setting that the optimal bid prices (or shadow prices) derived from the dual problem correspond to (generalized) gradients of the value function obtained from the dynamic programming formulation.
Connection to forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). Akan [2] shows that through another perturbation, the optimal primal and dual state trajectories can be expressed as a solution to a FBSDE; see El Karoui et al. [15] and the references therein for an overview of FBSDEs. This intriguing connection is useful in two regards: First, the numerical methods for solving FBSDEs can be adapted to our setting to compute (near) optimal bid prices; see, for example, Ma et al. [19] and Duffie et al. [13] for PDE methods and Bouchard and Touzi [10] and Bender and Zhang [6] for Monte-Carlo methods for solving FBSDEs. Indeed, the latter studies report encouraging results for solving FBSDEs in high dimensions. Second, the question of whether there exists an -optimal bid-price control in the classical sense can equivalently be stated as a question of the existence of a solution to a FBSDE; see Akan [2] for further discussion.
Sufficient conditions for existence of optimal classical bid-price controls. Examples 1 and 2 potentially provide some insights into the reasons for possible nonoptimality of classical bid-price controls. Recall that Example 1 studies a continuous-time, rate-based version of the counterexample of Talluri and van Ryzin [28] . Our setup has two important features which lead to optimality of classical bid-price controls in this example. First, the bookings at each point in time consume only an infinitesimal amount of capacity. Second, we allow frequent (indeed continuous) updating of bid prices. The setup of Talluri and van Ryzin does not have these features. Therefore, in addition to the discreteness of the problem, the example potentially suggests that infrequent updating of bid prices may be another reason for non optimality of classical bid-price controls. Moreover, Example 2 indicates that the classical bid-price controls are not optimal in general, where the nonoptimality stems from the fact that no bang-bang solution is optimal in that example. Thus, the optimality of classical bid-price controls also requires existence of optimal bang-bang solutions to the network revenue management problem (P). Finally, the notion of strict complementary slackness may help identify conditions under which the classical bid-price controls are optimal. It may also suggest additional insights on the potential reasons for nonoptimality of classical bid-price controls; see Akan [2] for further discussion. Nonetheless, identifying conditions on problem primitives that render classical bid-price controls optimal remains an open problem for future research.
Comparing (B1) with the set of admissible controls for the primal problem in the framework of Bismut [8, , first thing to note is that there is no stochastic integration term and martingale term in (B1).
To facilitate the analysis to follow, define the indicator function F · for a given set F by F x = 0 if x ∈ F a.s. otherwise.
We express the network revenue management problem (P) in terms of the convex integrand L and the convex lower semi-continuous functional l which are defined as follows. Define
In (B2),ẋ denotes the rate of change of x, where x is the state variable denoting the vector of remaining capacities. The integrand L serves the purpose of eliminating the hard constraints of the network revenue management problem (P) by appending them to the objective function as penalty expressions. In this sense, the penalty expression J where the expression 0 ẏ t in the second line forcesẏ t = 0 for a.e. t ∈ × 0 T . Then, the dynamics of the dual variable y is given by where M is a square integrable martingale stopped at T , null at zero and adapted to the filtration t t ∈ + . Because the network revenue management problem (P) is trivially feasible (simply let u t = 0 for all t ∈ × 0 T ), the objective function values of (P) and (D) are equal to each other (Bismut [8, ). Proof of Proposition 4.1. The network revenue management problem (P) and the dual problem (D) have the same optimal objective value by Bismut [8, . Moreover, Bismut [8, Theorem IV-2] letting u be a feasible control for (P) with the corresponding state trajectory x, and y 0 M be a feasible control for (D) with the corresponding state trajectory y, the controls u and y 0 M are optimal for (P) and (D), respectively, if and only if they satisfy the coextremality conditions stated in Bismut [8, Definition IV-1]. To be more specific about the coextremality conditions for the network revenue management problem and its dual problem, we derive the subgradients of L, l 0 and l T , where L is a convex integrand and l 0 and l T are convex functionals as in the derivation of the dual network revenue management problem (D).
First, we calculate the subgradient of L from its epigraphical normals. To that end, we use Rockafellar and Wets [26, Theorem 8.9 ] which proves that for h n → − + and any pointx at which h is finite, one has
where, epi h denotes the epigraph of h defined as
and N epi h x h x is the set of vectors normal to the set epi h at x h x in the general sense as in Rockafellar and Wets [26, Definition 6.3] . For t ∈ × 0 T , the epigraph of the integrand L at t is given by
since the points x ẋ ∈ 2K where L t x ẋ = are such that the vertical line x ẋ × misses epi L t . Then, we can write
First, note that for
